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On April 1, 2020, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) issued a rule
affecting construction industry employers and unions. The rule provides that
even when an employer has signed a written contract with the union, agreeing
that a majority of its employees want the union to represent them, that the
employer (or its employees) can challenge the union’s status as a representative
unless the union can prove it had majority support when the employer agreed it
did.1 In considering this rule, one should take into account that in the
construction industry, employers can choose their source of workers in a way
that makes it more or less likely that those workers will choose to be represented
by a union, especially after being influenced by their employer. Nonetheless,
the Board asserted that its new rule was intended to protect the choice of
employees. As this Article will explain, it is more likely that construction
employers’ choices will be more often served by the new rule, which hereinafter
will be referenced as the “Construction Union Proof Rule.”
Construction industry employers can choose a union as its source of workers
even prior to hiring any employees, which is legally permissible for that industry
only because of section 8(f) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).2
In 1959 Congress passed that provision on a bipartisan vote, and Republican
President Dwight Eisenhower signed it into law,3 because the politicians knew
that many contractors in the construction industry preferred to hire employees
+
Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D., University of Virginia and
B.S. Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor Relations.
1. See 29 C.F.R. § 103.22 (2020).
2. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(f), 29 U.S.C. § 158(f).
3. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW ch. 4, §§ VI.A.4, VI.B (Am. Bar Ass’n, 7th ed. 2019).
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for projects from hiring halls administered by unions.4 Such hiring from union
hiring halls can be “exclusive” or “nonexclusive” depending on a contractor’s
or other employer’s agreement with the union.5 For either type of hiring hall,
unions cannot discriminate against employees who are not members of the union
in referring employees for hiring.6 In addition, under the express terms of
Section 8(f), an employer’s agreement with a union to hire employees referred
from the union hall cannot be raised as a ground to “bar” a representation
election sought by employees on whether that union, or any union, will represent
them in dealings with their employer.7
The rule issued on April 1, 2020 by the current Board changes the
requirements for a construction union to (at least securely) maintain its status as
a majority representative of a contractor’s employees.8 Under this Construction
Union Proof Rule, no matter what language a contractor agreed to with a union
regarding its recognition of that union as the “majority representative” of that
contractor’s employees, neither that agreement nor the union’s relationship with
that contractor would bar a petition for an election on whether that union would
remain the employees’ representative.9
This Construction Union Proof Rule could be only the “tip of an iceberg” in
which the Board, through subsequent decisions, could hugely transform union
representation of employees in the construction industry.10 The transformation
is in the form of rules that could give construction contractors nearly limitless
authority and ability to decide when their employees would, and would not, be
represented by a union (or at least to vote on such representation) and to time
those decisions to the contractor’s maximum advantage. The rules would do
nearly nothing to benefit any construction employees ever represented by a
union, even though, as explained in Part I of this Article, the Board repeatedly
claims in its Construction Union Proof Rule that its purpose is to serve
“employee choice” regarding union representation. The Board’s Construction
Union Proof Rule, and any rules it adopts afterwards through its decisions, are
likely to be upheld by many federal courts, which also could add or instead adopt

4. See H.R. REP. NO. 86-741, at 19–20 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2441–
43.
5. See LEE MODJESKA ET AL., FEDERAL LABOR LAW: NLRB PRACTICE § 7:13 (Aug. 2020
ed.).
6. Id.
7. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(f).
8. See Representation—Case Procedures: Election Bars; Proof of Majority Support in
Construction-Industry Collective-Bargaining Relationships, 85 Fed. Reg. 18366-01 (Apr. 1,
2020)(codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.22) [hereinafter Construction Union Proof Rule].
9. Id. Any agreement between a contractor and a union would not bar a petition for a
representation election for any longer than three years. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 3, at ch. 10, §§ II.E, II.E.2.
10. See infra Section I.B.
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new rules to govern representation of construction industry employees.11 In
addition, the Board and federal courts could rely on these newly created legal
rules to change labor law throughout the U.S. economy because, as this Article
discusses, many features of employer-worker relationships and working
environments are, in many parts of the twenty-first century American economy,
becoming more like the twentieth and twenty-first century construction
industry.12
Part I of this Article discusses the new employee representation rule the Board
adopted on April 1, 2020, and the labor law precedents the Board did and did
not rely on in fashioning the rule. Part I goes on to describe and explain relevant
aspects of the current U.S. unionized construction industry. Throughout Part I,
this Article discusses how the Board’s Proof Rule would mostly augment
contractor opportunities to choose whether their employees will be represented
by a union. Part II of this Article begins with a discussion of the history of U.S.
labor law in the construction industry. This overview is followed by a discussion
of how the Board’s Proof Rule, and possible subsequent decisions, would depart
from long-established and congressionally-intended labor law rules for the
construction industry and—by increasing opportunities for contractors to
exercise their choices—likely harm employee representation in that industry.
Part III, as mentioned above, explains how many aspects of the relationship
between employers and workers in broad sectors of the U.S. economy are
becoming more similar to the construction industry, making the Board’s likely
changes to construction industry labor law relevant to labor law for many other
millions of employees.
I. THE BOARD’S 2020 CONSTRUCTION UNION PROOF RULE AND THE CURRENT
UNIONIZED CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
A. The Current National Labor Relations Board’s 2020 Construction Union
Proof Rule on Employee Representation in the Construction Industry
The current effort began in September 2018 when the Board in invited filing
of amicus briefs in the then-pending Loshaw Thermal Technology decision.13 In
that decision, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Eric M. Fine relied on the
Board’s 2001 ruling in Staunton Fuel & Material, Inc.,14 and two 2000 decisions
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,15 in holding that collective bargaining
11. See, e.g., IBEW Local Unions 605 & 985 v. NLRB, 973 F.3d 451, 457 (5th Cir. 2020)
and Casino Pauma v. NLRB, 888 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2018), for recent examples of federal
appeals court decisions applying deferential standards of review to NLRB decisions.
12. See infra Section III.
13. Notice and Invitation to File Briefs at 2, Loshaw Thermal Tech., LLC, No. 05-CA-158650
(N.L.R.B. Sept. 11, 2018) [hereinafter Invitation].
14. Staunton Fuel & Material, Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001).
15. NLRB v. Triple C Maint., Inc., 219 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000); NLRB v. Okla.
Installation Co., 219 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000).
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agreement language can be sufficient to prove a construction industry union’s
majority status.16 ALJ Fine had also found that the employer’s challenge to the
union’s majority status was time-barred, applying the Board’s rule from its 1993
Casale Industries17 decision that such a challenge must occur within six months
of granting such recognition.18
In its invitation for briefs in Loshaw Thermal Technology, the Board
explained that the employer was asking the Board to overrule Staunton Fuel and
to reconsider Casale Industries.19 The Board apparently decided it would,
because the first questions the Board listed that it wanted briefs to address were,
“Should the Board adhere to, modify, or overrule Staunton Fuel?”20 and, if that
decision were overruled, “what standard should the Board adopt in its stead?”21
Further questions the Board raised included “what should constitute sufficient
evidence” to prove majority status and whether contract language should be
considered pertinent to that issue.22 The Board also asked that briefs address,
regardless of its decision to overrule Staunton Fuel or not, whether the Board
should revise its Casale Industries rule that “contract language alone would
continue to be sufficient to establish 9(a) status whenever that status goes
unchallenged for 6 months after 9(a) recognition is granted.”23
The Board suspended this invitation for briefs a month later, after the union
party in Loshaw Thermal Technology notified the agency that it was
withdrawing its unfair labor practice charge in the case.24 Two months later, the
Board rescinded its invitation for briefs on voluntary recognition in the
construction industry.25 A labor journalist reporting on this development wrote
that this “leaves in place key precedents with enormous practical consequences
for businesses and unions—at least for now” but that “[t]he board could and
likely will revisit the issue, if it gets another case with a similar set of
circumstances and issues.”26
As it turned out, the Board did not wait for such a case. Instead, on August
12, 2019, the Board issued and published in the Federal Register a Notice of
16. See Loshaw Thermal Tech., LLC, No. 05-CA-158650, 2016 NLRB LEXIS 493, at *21–
22, *24–26 (N.L.R.B. July 7, 2016).
17. Casale Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 951, 953 (1993).
18. Loshaw, 2016 NLRB LEXIS 496, at *19–20.
19. Invitation, supra note 13, at 1.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Robert Iafolla, NLRB Halts Public Input on Construction Industry Bargaining,
BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (Oct. 16, 2018, 12:06 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/nlrb-halts-public-input-on-construction-industry-bargaining.
25. Hassan A. Kanu, NLRB Drops Construction Industry Bargaining-Policy Review,
BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (Dec. 14, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/nlrb-drops-construction-industry-bargaining-policy-review.
26. Id.
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Proposed Rulemaking on, among other things, “Proof of Majority Support in
Construction Industry Collective-Bargaining Relationships.”27 The Board
proposed “to overrule Staunton Fuel” and to promulgate a rule that “contract
language alone cannot create a 9(a) bargaining relationship in the construction
industry,” which the Board referred to as “the D.C. Circuit’s position.”28 The
Board further proposed that, in addition to contract language in which an
employer recognized the union’s majority status, the Board would require
“extrinsic proof of contemporaneous majority support . . . .”29 Unlike in its 2018
invitation for briefs, the Board did not mention the Casale Industries time limit
rule in its 2019 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The Board initially requested
comments within 60 days, with an additional 14 days for reply comments, but
twice extended the deadline for comments so that they were due and submitted
by January 2020.30
As noted earlier, the Board issued its final rule on April 1, 2020. In explaining
the labor history leading to its proposal, the Board, in both its proposed rule and
final rule, began with the 1959 amendments, which, as will be explained below,
is a questionable place to begin.31 The Board correctly stated that Congress
enacted Section 8(f) of the Act in 1959, which allows “employer[s] engaged
primarily in the building and construction industry to make an agreement
covering [its] employees engaged” in that industry with a union that does not
represent a majority of those employees or even before that employer has hired
any employees.32 In addition, as the Board also said, an agreement made lawful
only by Section 8(f) does not bar any NLRB-administered representation
elections provided for by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).33
The Board next summarized the “conversion doctrine” that was applied from
1971 until 1987, describing it as a union obtaining majority status “by means
other than a Board election or a majority-based voluntary recognition.”34 The
Board then almost immediately quoted the Board’s criticisms of the conversion
doctrine when it overruled it in 1987 in John Deklewa & Sons, Inc.35 The Board
next discussed what Deklewa said about how a construction union could now
27. See Representation—Case Procedures: Election Bars; Proof of Majority Support in
Construction Industry Collective-Bargaining Relationships, 84 Fed. Reg. 39930, 39930 (proposed
Aug. 12, 2019) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103)) [hereinafter Proposed Rule].
28. Id. at 39938.
29. Id.
30. See Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8.
31. See infra Section II.
32. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(f), 29 U.S.C. § 158(f); Construction
Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18366.
33. § 8(f); Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18400. The reference in Section
8(f) to “a petition filed pursuant to section 9(c) or 9(e)” covers all NLRB-administered
representation elections. See The Developing Labor Law, supra note 3, at ch. 10, §10.I.
34. Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18368.
35. Id. at 18368 (quoting John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1378 (1987),
enforced sub nom. Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988)).
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obtain a Section 9(a) relationship with an employer. The Board observed that in
Deklewa the Board had stated that “the party asserting the existence of a
[Section] 9(a) relationship [is required to] prov[e] it.”36 The Board then
acknowledged that the Deklewa Board had stated that construction unions could
still seek Section 9(a) recognition from employers with which they had Section
8(f) relationships and had specifically held that a construction union, “could
achieve 9(a) status through ‘voluntary recognition accorded . . . by the employer
of a stable workforce where that recognition is based on a clear showing of
majority support among the [union] employees, e.g., a valid card majority.’”37
In the final Construction Union Proof Rule’s discussion of some of the first
Board decisions applying Deklewa, the Board in effect quoted prior decisions as
stating that to prove majority support, the union “would have to show its ‘express
demand for, and an employer’s voluntary grant of, recognition to the union as
bargaining representative, based on a showing of support for the union among a
majority of employees . . . .’”38 However, the Board failed to mention that it did
not consider how the union sought or obtained voluntary recognition in any of
the cited decisions. In the American Thoro-Clean, Ltd. decision, the Board,
reviewing a pre-Deklewa Administrative Law Judge decision, held that the
employer was bound to a succession of Section 8(f) agreements, and the Board
therefore agreed with the judge’s decision that the employer violated Section
8(a)(5) by failing to comply with the most recent Section 8(f) agreement.39 In
Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., the Board considered and rejected, in disagreement
with the then-General Counsel, the union’s argument that if its relationship with
the employer began prior to the enactment of Section 8(f), that was sufficient to
presume that the union had majority Section 9(a) status.40

36. Id. at 18368 (quoting Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1385 n.41 (“In light of the legislative
history and the traditional prevailing practice in the construction industry, we will require the party
asserting the existence of a 9(a) relationship to prove it.”)).
37. Id. (quoting Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1387 n.53).
38. Id. (quoting Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 977, 979–80 (1988)).
39. Am. Thoro-Clean, Ltd., 283 N.L.R.B. 1107, 1108–09 (1987).
40. Brannan Sand, 289 N.L.R.B. 977, 978–80 (1988). The Board, in explaining its ruling,
did at one point state that “reliance on the mere fact that a collective-bargaining relationship
predates Section 8(f) to establish 9(a) status differs fundamentally from reliance on a Board election
or recognition based on a contemporaneous showing of majority support for the union . . . .” Id. at
980. The Board based this reasoning on employee choice when it added that a pre-1959 relationship
“does not take into account employees’ representational desires and does not further the
fundamental statutory interest in employee free choice.” Id. However, the Board found it necessary
to add at the start of the next paragraph that “the presumption urged in this case has no basis in
fact.” Id. The court likely made that statement because in that case the union did not request
voluntary recognition, and, after the contractor unilaterally repudiated its relationship with the
union, it went on strike. See id. at 977–78. The strike and the contractor’s use of temporary
replacements might have, in turn, led to the contractor’s claim that it had “oral and documentary
evidence which it assert[ed] w[ould] demonstrate that the General Counsel c[ould not] prove that
the Union ha[d] 9(a) status[,]” a fact the Board did rely on in its holding. Id. at 983. Given this
reasoning in Brannan Sand, the decision provides little or no support for finding that, prior to
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In the final Construction Union Proof Rule, the Board next turned to the
precedent it overruled—the 2001 Staunton Fuel decision—which set the law on
this issue of majority status until the Board issued its new rule on April 1, 2020.41
As the final Construction Union Proof Rule stated, the Board in Staunton Fuel
held that language in an agreement between the employer and the union could
establish the union’s Section 9(a) majority status.42 The required Staunton Fuel
conditions are that the contract language:
[U]nequivocally indicates that (1) the union requested recognition as
the majority or 9(a) representative of the unit employees; (2) the
employer recognized the union as the majority or 9(a) bargaining
representative; and (3) the employer’s recognition was based on the
union’s having shown, or having offered to show, evidence of its
majority support.43
The proposed rule acknowledged that this test was borrowed from two thenrecent decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,44
and that the Board had found that this test “properly balances Section 9(a)’s
emphasis on employee choice with Section 8(f)’s recognition of the practical
realities of the construction industry” and allowed employers and unions to form
“9(a) bargaining relationships easily and unmistakably where they seek to do
so.”45
The Board, when identifying the reasons it wanted to change this rule, relied
heavily on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit’s 2018 decision in Colorado Fire Sprinkler, Inc. v. NLRB.46 In that
decision, the court vacated a Board order in which the Board had held, based on
its Staunton Fuel decision, that “clear and unequivocal contract language can
establish a 9(a) relationship in the construction industry” and that the employer’s
“evidence fail[ed] to show that the Union lacked majority support in the unit at
the time the Respondent agreed to that contractual language.”47 The Board
acknowledged that, in Colorado Fire Sprinkler, the D.C. Circuit had held that
the purpose of Section 8(f) was to “provide employees in the inconstant and fluid
construction and building industries some opportunity for collective

Staunton Fuel, the Board had already resolved what evidence of majority support was required for
a union to prove Section 9(a) status.
41. See Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18369, 18389 (discussing Staunton
Fuel & Material, Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001)).
42. Id. (citing Staunton Fuel, 335 N.L.R.B. at 719–20).
43. Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 39936 (quoting Staunton Fuel, 335 N.L.R.B. at 720).
44. Id. at 39935–36 (citing NLRB v. Triple C Maint., Inc., 219 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000);
NLRB v. Okla. Installation Co., 219 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2000)).
45. Id. at 39936 (quoting Staunton Fuel, 335 N.L.R.B. at 719–20).
46. Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18369 (citing Colo. Fire Sprinkler, Inc.
v. NLRB, 891 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2018)).
47. Colo. Fire Sprinkler, 891 F.3d at 1041; Colo. Fire Sprinkler, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 55,
2016 NLRB LEXIS 543, at *3–4, *4 n.4 (July 22, 2016) (citing Staunton Fuel, 335 N.L.R.B. 717).
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representation[,]”48 but the Board emphasized that in that decision, the D.C.
Circuit stated that “[b]ecause the statutory objective is to ensure that only unions
chosen by a majority of employees enjoy Section 9(a)’s enhanced protections,
the Board must faithfully police the presumption of Section 8(f) status and the
strict burden of proof to overcome it.”49 However, perhaps tellingly, the Board
did not mention that in the decision the D.C. Circuit also stated that “what
matters is that the affirmative evidence of majority support exists in the
record.”50
The Board also relied on and quoted at length the D.C. Circuit’s 2003 decision
in Nova Plumbing, Inc. v. NLRB.51 In that decision the court refused to enforce
a Board order requiring the employer to “continue bargaining” with a union
when the Board’s decision was based “solely on a contract provision suggesting
that the company and the union intended a 9(a) relationship despite strong record
evidence that the union may not have enjoyed majority support as required by
section 9(a) . . . .”52 The Board pointed out that the Nova Plumbing decision
relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in International Ladies’
Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB53 and quoted the D.C. Circuit’s statement that
“[a]n agreement between an employer and union is void and unenforceable,
Garment Workers holds, if it purports to recognize a union that actually lacks
majority support as the employees’ exclusive representative.”54 The Board
further quoted the D.C. Circuit’s finding that “the Board’s test allowed
employers and unions to ‘collud[e] at the expense of employees and rival unions’
. . . .”55 This concern for employer-union “collusion,” especially to prevent
representation elections, will be discussed again below.56
However, other important language in the D.C. Circuit’s Nova Plumbing
decision was not quoted or referenced by the Board. For example, the Board
failed to mention that the D.C. Circuit in Nova Plumbing took pains to make
clear that it did “not mean to suggest that contract language and intent are
irrelevant[,]” and instead held that these “are perfectly legitimate factors that the
Board may consider in determining whether the Deklewa presumption has been
48. Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18369 (quoting Colo. Fire Sprinkler, 891
F.3d at 1038–39).
49. Colo. Fire Sprinkler, 891 F.3d at 1039; Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at
18369 (quoting Colo. Fire Sprinkler 891 F.3d at 1039).
50. See Colo. Fire Sprinkler, 891 F.3d at 1039.
51. Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18369 (quoting Nova Plumbing, Inc. v.
NLRB, 330 F.3d 531, 536–37 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
52. Nova Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 533.
53. Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18369 (citing Int’l Ladies’ Garment
Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961)).
54. Nova Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 537; Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18369
(quoting Nova Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 537).
55. Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18369 (quoting Nova Plumbing, 330 F.3d
at 537) (alteration in original).
56. See infra notes 82–83, 162 and accompanying text.
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overcome.”57 The D.C. Circuit next stated that contract language and the
parties’ intent “cannot be dispositive, at least where, as here, the record contains
strong indications that the parties had only a section 8(f) relationship.”58
The D.C. Circuit in Nova Plumbing went on to discuss multiple key facts it
relied on in its decision, which the Board did not reference at all. One example
was that “the [collective bargaining agreement] itself—which is apparently the
sole basis for [the union’s] claim to section 9(a) status—states that Nova’s
recognition of the union rests on ‘independently verified[,]’ [by a Certified
Public Accounting Firm,59] proof that the union represents a majority of unit
employees.”60 The court then observed that the “the record contains no evidence
of independent verification of employee support[,]” and next stated that “the
Board and union have failed to demonstrate majority representation under the
very boilerplate language on which they rely to overcome the Deklewa
presumption.”61 The D.C. Circuit continued to rely on this lack of compliance
with contract language in stating that if the Board wanted to rely on contract
language to prove majority status, “it must take such language seriously when a
recognition clause indicates that there is a concrete basis upon which to assess
employee support. Otherwise, unions and employers would be free to agree to
such self-serving language with no threat of challenge.”62 The D.C. Circuit’s
reliance on lack of evidence of compliance with recognition agreement language
is consistent with an argument discussed below—that it is fair and reasonable to
bind parties to the language to which they have agreed.63
In Nova Plumbing, the D.C. Circuit also relied on the union and NLRB’s
failure to present any authorization cards of any employees to show support of
the union, and the union representative’s testimony that he recalled only three
employees who had signed such cards.64 The D.C. Circuit contrasted this lack
of authorization cards with record evidence indicating that the union was not
supported by Nova Plumbing’s employees.65 In sum, much more underlaid the
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Nova Plumbing than the Board referenced in its
Construction Union Proof Rule.

57. Nova Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 537. The Board did not quote this language even though the
AFL-CIO quoted it in its Comment, urging the Board not to proceed with its proposal. See
American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), Comment
Letter on Proposed Rule on Representation—Case Procedures: Election Bars; Proof of Majority
Support in Construction Industry Collective Bargaining Relationships 41–42 (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NLRB-2019-0001-0138.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. See id. at 535.
60. Id. at 538.
61. Id. at 537–38.
62. Id. at 538.
63. See infra Section II.B.
64. Nova Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 537–38.
65. Id.
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It is worth noting here, and it will be discussed more fully below,66 that in the
two D.C. Circuit decisions discussed by the Board in its proposal (Colorado Fire
Sprinkler67 and Nova Plumbing68), the rhetoric referred to the “choice” and
rights of employees, but the actions at issue were not those of employees but
those of contractors. The term “contractors,” rather than “employers” is used
because, at the times relevant actions occur, the contractor sometimes has no
employees,69 or the employees for whom the decision expresses concern (e.g.
those working for an employer when it chooses whether to renew an agreement)
are often not the employees who will be working for the contractor if its
challenged decision is upheld, as when a contractor stops using employees
referred by a union and instead uses employees from another source or hired “off
the street.”70 In fact, it consistently has been (and likely will continue to be) the
contractor’s choice that is really at issue, and—when that choice is upheld by
the Board or a court—the contractor, not the employees, always gets to choose
the desired outcome.71
The D.C. Circuit itself discussed the role of the contractor, and why it should
be limited, in its 2006 decision in M & M Backhoe Service, Inc. v. NLRB.72 The
Board did not mention that D.C. Circuit decision in its 2019 proposed rule; and
in responding to comments in its 2020 final rule, the Board only referenced the
decision as stating that a union with a Section 8(f) contract could obtain Section
9(a) majority status by winning an election or by “‘demand[ing] recognition
from the employer by providing proof of majority support’ and finding a 9(a)
relationship based on signed authorization cards.” 73 In the final Construction
Union Proof Rule, the Board did not mention that, in M & M Backhoe, the D.C.
Circuit did not hold that “providing [the] proof of majority support” meant the
union actually showing the employer the proof of such support, because the
central issue in M & M Backhoe was whether the employer actually had to

66. See infra Section II.B.
67. Colo. Fire Sprinkler, Inc. v. NLRB, 891 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
68. Nova Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 531.
69. E.g., Colo. Fire Sprinkler, 891 F.3d at 1036 (involving a contractor who made agreement
with the union at a time when it had no employees).
70. See, e.g., Staunton Fuel & Material, Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 717, 727–20 (2001) and
McKenzie Engineering Co., 326 NLRB 473, 488–89 (1998), for a discussion of how employers
hired new employees directly, rather than using employees referred through the union’s hiring hall,
after withdrawing union recognition.
71. See, e.g., Staunton Fuel, 335 N.L.R.B. at 720–21 (holding that an employer directly hiring
employees, instead of accepting them from the union hiring hall, had lawfully withdrawn
recognition from the union); Yellowstone Plumbing, Inc., 286 NLRB 993, 994, 997, 1013–
14)(1987)(upholding withdrawal of union recognition by employer that subsequently hired
employees directly instead of through the union hiring hall).
72. M & M Backhoe Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 469 F.3d 1047, 1050–51 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
73. Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18389 (quoting M & M Backhoe, 469
F.3d at 1050).
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review the union’s proof of support for the union to obtain majority status.74 In
M & M Backhoe the D.C. Circuit said no, holding that “[a]n employer who
recognizes a union after the union offers to provide evidence of its majority
status cannot revoke that recognition solely because the employer never took the
union up on its offer—provided that the union actually had majority support.”75
Significantly, the D.C. Circuit next stated, based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing76—which the Board also relied on in its
proposed rule—that “[t]o rule otherwise would be to allow the employer to
frustrate the employees’ section 7 rights by turning its back to the union’s
evidence.”77
In M & M Backhoe, the D.C. Circuit distinguished its prior ruling in Nova
Plumbing (a decision the Board strongly relied on to support its rule) on the
ground that, in Nova Plumbing, there was no evidence in the record that the
union (ever) actually had majority support.78 In contrast, the record in M & M
Backhoe showed, and the Board had found, that “a majority of employees
voluntarily signed union authorization cards signifying their support” of the
union.79 The D.C. Circuit therefore concluded that “[u]nder this [employerlimiting] standard, [the union] properly converted its relationship with M & M
to one governed by section 9(a), and M & M [could not] disclaim the conversion
after the fact.”80 Notably, the D.C. Circuit in M & M Backhoe also did not
impose any requirement of “contemporaneity” on the evidence of majority
support, unlike the Board’s final Construction Union Proof Rule requirement of
a “contemporaneous” showing of support, with no explanation of what that
means. The problems caused by this undefined “contemporaneous” requirement
are discussed below.81
M & M Backhoe is one of numerous case examples where a court or other
legal decisionmaker did not emphasize, as the Board did in its proposed and final
rule, that a union and contractor might “collude” to limit employee choice on
representation,82 but instead stressed how a contractor might disregard the
74. See M & M Backhoe, 469 F.3d at 1050–51.
75. Id. at 1051.
76. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
77. M & M Backhoe, 469 F.3d at 1051 (citing Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 596–98); see also
Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 39938 (quoting Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 602).
78. M & M Backhoe, 469 F.3d at 1050.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1051.
81. See infra Section II.B.
82. The Board did not mention any such examples of collusion in its proposed rule. See
generally Proposed Rule, supra note 27. Given that the Board itself stated in its final rule that only
“minor, non-substantive changes” were made between its proposed and final rule, one might
question how important actual evidence of real-world collusion was to the Board. See Construction
Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18370. In fairness to the Board, however, it did respond to
commenters’ points about “collusion” by referencing past Board decisions in which the employer
and union agreed that the union “represented a majority of its employees” prior to the employer
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preference of its employees for union representation to serve instead its own
“choice”—the recent real-world examples of which are demonstrated by the
facts of M & M Backhoe and many other cases and contractor actions.83
B. The Current Unionized Construction Industry
The unionized construction industry, since its beginning in the nineteenth
century, has been characterized by training through apprenticeship programs and
the use of so-called “hiring halls” to refer construction employees to jobs with
multiple contractors with union agreements.84 Every employee referred by the
union is also represented by it and works under an agreement between the union
and a contractor that has chosen to obtain its construction workforce from the
union.85 As is discussed more fully below in the section on labor law history,
Congress recognized (and it is still true) that employment by one or more
construction employees by a specific contractor is often seasonal, short and
intermittent.86 As a result, it is not unusual for a unionized construction
employee to work for many different contractors within the construction
“season,” with the union effectively providing employment even though the
union is never that employee’s “employer.”87 Additionally, construction
workers often do not work every day, even when working for the same employer,
depending on factors such as the weather, the availability of key materials, and
what work must be done on a project on each day.88 Consequently, special labor

having hired any employees, which the Board referenced in the final rule as “parties [who] falsified
majority support.” Id. at 18390; NLRB v. Triple C Maint., Inc., 219 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir.
2000). This Article discusses the inappropriateness of the Board’s reference to these agreements
as containing language in which majority support was “falsified” or as being relevant to
“collusion.” See infra note 213.
83. See infra Section II.A.
84. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, EMPLOYEE AND UNION MEMBER GUIDE TO LABOR
LAW § 5:35 (2020).
85. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at ch. 13 § VII, ch. 26 §§ II.G, V
(discussing the role of construction unions in referring employees); Boilermakers Local No. 374 v.
NLRB, 852 F.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(noting that “[construction] workers can obtain jobs
only through union referrals” and explaining the obligations that creates for construction unions).
86. See infra Section II.A (discussing legislative history of 1959 amendments to the Labor
Management Relations Act).
87. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 84, § 5:35.
88. See id. at § 5:1; Lonnie Golden, Irregular Work Scheduling and Its Consequences, ECON.
POL’Y INST. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 394 1 (Apr. 9, 2015) https://files.epi.org/pdf/82524.pdf; Jeffrey
Hilgert, The Future of Workplace Health and Safety as a Fundamental Human Right, 34 COMPAR.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 715, 726 (2013); Xiuwen Dong, Long Workhours, Work Scheduling and WorkRelated Injuries Among Construction Workers in the United States, 31 SCANDINAVIAN J. WORK
ENV’T HEALTH 329, 329, 331–32 (2005); see also J.E. Brown Elec., Inc., 315 NLRB 620, 621–24
(1994) (discussion in majority and concurring opinions of construction employees’ typical work
schedules).
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law rules have had to be created for “employee choice,” through representation
election or otherwise, in the construction industry.89
In the U.S. construction industry—both unionized and non-unionized—for
every project sought by an ultimate customer or client, construction on projects
of significant scope and dollar amount will almost always be overseen by one or
more general contractor(s) and/or construction manager(s).90 This overseer will
hire one or more subcontractors for each construction trade they oversee, and
sometimes all the subcontractors for all the trades that will work on the project.91
Consequently, unless the ultimate user of the project specifies otherwise, it is
often the general contractor and/or construction manager who decides, for each
trade or type of work on the project, whether the subcontractors will be
contractors who obtain their employees from one or more unions, contractors
whose employees are not represented by a union, or a mix of both.92 Sometimes
the ultimate user, or someone else with control over a project, will in fact specify
whether they want some or all of a project to be built with employees working
under agreement(s) between one or more unions and one or more contractors.93
Such agreements are often called Project Labor Agreements.94
In the unionized construction industry many contractors decide, because of
the nature of the industry, to join or assign bargaining authority to multiemployer
associations that negotiate agreements with unions.95
Through these
associations, or other arrangements between construction unions and multiple
contractors, millions of construction employees, retirees, and their family
members are provided benefits (e.g. pension/retirement, health) through
89. See, e.g., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at ch. 31 § II.G.2 (stating that
because of “intermittent employment” of construction employees, special rules exist for eligibility
to vote in representation elections); P.J. Dick Contracting, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 150, 151 (1988)
(discussing how unit in the construction industry can be based on the definition in the collective
bargaining agreement).
90. See Jason O’Leary, What’s the Difference? A General Contractor vs. A Construction
Manager, SURETY BONDS DIRECT (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.suretybondsdirect.com/educate/
general-contractor-vs-construction-manager.
91. See id.
92. See A. SAMER EZELDIN & AHMED M. ALHADY, CONSTRUCTION SITE COORDINATION
AND MANAGEMENT GUIDE § 4.8 (titled “Subcontracting” and discussing how the general
contractor hires subcontractors)(2018); Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645,
658–60 (1982)(discussing widespread use of subcontracting in the construction industry); Chi.
Reg’l Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Schal Bovis, Inc., 826 F.3d 397, 406–07 (7th Cir.
2016) (discussing how construction contractors can choose between one of two different unions as
a source of the employees who will perform work).
93. See Jared Bernstein, Project Labor Agreements: A Better Deal for All, WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (Apr. 12, 2010, 4:16 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/04/12/projectlabor-agreements-a-better-deal-all.
94. See, e.g., id.; see generally John T. Dunlop, Project Labor Agreements, (Harv. U. Joint
Ctr. for Hous. Stud., Working Paper No. W02-7, 2002) (giving a historical overview of the use of
project labor agreements).
95. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 84, § 5:1; THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,
supra note 3, at ch. 11 § III.D.1.
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multiemployer benefit plans.96 Multiemployer bargaining in the construction
industry has, for the most part, been stable for more than fifty years,97 but
defining units for the purposes of the NLRB conducting elections has led to
many challenging issues and inconsistent decisions in cases when a contractor
has relied on a multiemployer association for bargaining.98 The Board also uses
a unique formula for construction industry elections to determine voter
eligibility, which it reaffirmed in its 1992 Steiny & Co. decision by finding that
the formula should be applied to all elections in the construction industry.99 In
its final Construction Union Proof Rule, the Board reserved these and other
issues,100 but it probably will have to decide them much more frequently because
of the sub-rules it included in the final Construction Union Proof Rule it
issued.101
Unions and unionized contractors jointly spend an estimated $1.3 billion a
year on apprenticeship training for hundreds of thousands of persons at 1,600
training facilities across the country.102 With regard to the “employee choice”
the Board seeks to serve, many construction employees in many skilled trades
96. See What Is a Multiemployer Plan?, INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFIT PLANS,
https://www.ifebp.org/news/featuredtopics/multiemployer/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov.
24, 2020); see also Sean Forbes, Construction Multiemployer Pension Plans Doing Well,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 24, 2017, 5:58 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employeebenefits/construction-multiemployer-pension-plans-doing-well.
97. See, e.g., Chel LaCort, 315 N.L.R.B. 1036, 1036–37 (1994) (declining to change the rules
for withdrawing from multiemployer bargaining that were first established in Retail Associates,
120 N.L.R.B. 388 (1958)).
98. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 84, § 5:6 (summarizing “NLRB elections,”
“appropriate bargaining unit[s],” and “when employer and union are parties to prehire
agreement[s]”); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at ch. 11 § III.B.3 (“The building
and construction industry has posed special problems of unit determination because of the
fluctuating nature of the workforce and the constant changes in job sites.”); Cleveland Constr. v.
NLRB, 44 F.3d 1010, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (vacating the Board’s decision in favor of a multi-site
bargaining unit).
99. See Steiny & Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1328 (1992); NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra
note 84, § 5:8.
100. See Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18391, 18393 (reserving on multiple
issues, including what evidence will be sufficient to prove majority support).
101. The “subrules” include the requirements of “positive evidence” of an “unequivocal
demand” for recognition as the majority representative, of “unequivocal acceptance” by the
employer of such status, and of that acceptance being “based on a contemporaneous showing of
support from a majority of employees in an appropriate unit.” See 29 C.F.R. § 103.22. Another
“subrule” the Board said it adopted partially overruled the Board’s decision in Casale Indus. Inc.,
311 N.L.R.B. 951, 953 (1993), in which the Board had decided that the majority status of a
construction union could be challenged only within six months of when it had been granted. The
Board overruled that decision to the extent it would prevent an election petition from being filed
after the six-month period expired. See Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18391.
102. North America’s Building Trades Unions, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on
Apprenticeship Programs, Labor Standards for Registration, Amendment of Regulations 1, 20
(Sept. 5, 2019), https://nabtu.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/NABTU-IRAP-Comments-RIN1205-AB85.pdf.

2020]

The Future of Construction (and Maybe All) Labor Law

123

make their choice to work union or non-union when they first participate in one
of these apprenticeship programs. It remains to be seen what incentive unions,
and contractors with union-represented employees, would have to make such
investments if, now that the Board has adopted its Construction Union Proof
Rule, employers were to petition for elections or withdraw recognition based on
that rule and the Board’s language in adopting it.
There also remains a question of what incentives unions would have to spend
on apprenticeship training if unions were to train workers and refer them to
contractors. If non-union contractors were to hire such apprentices, they’d likely
ensure those employees would comprise less than a majority of that employer’s
construction employees, to support that employer’s claims the union lacks
majority status, which that employer might try to make real by dragging out an
unfair labor practice or representation proceeding, or both. Presidential
candidates from both major political parties say they want to provide skilled
construction labor to repair and update the U.S.’s infrastructure.103 If non-union
contractors and non-union contractor associations believe they can meet their
workforce needs by hiring skilled trades workers who were trained by unions,
as they are now doing,104 they might want to pause and consider how long they
can continue to do that.
In light of all these issues, the Board has decided to enter a thicket. As it
declined to resolve any of these of these issues it its final Construction Union
Proof Rule, the Board might be ill-equipped to deal with them if and when they
do arise.
II. CONSTRUCTION LABOR LAW HISTORY—AND POSSIBLE FUTURE
A. The History
Interestingly, given that the Board in its proposed and final rule exalted its
own secret ballot elections as the means for construction unions to obtain
majority status, the original NLRA did not even apply those representation
proceedings to the construction industry.105 That changed after the 1947
amendments, when the legislative history indicated that Congress intended the
construction industry to be covered by the law and the NLRB obliged.106 This

103. See Mike Kopp, To Beat the COVID-19 Recession, Invest in Roads, Bridges, Broadband
and More, THE GAZETTE (Sept. 20, 2020), https://gazette.com/opinion/perspective-to-beat-thecovid-19-recession-invest-in-roads-bridges-broadband-and-more/article_db2bdec6-f77e-11eabf9d-97778f52301e.html.
104. See Danny L. Caliendo, Building Trades Members, Their Skills & Contractors are Being
Transferred by Design to the Non-Union, LAB. RISING (Apr. 21, 2019),
http://laborrising.com/2019/04/building-trades-members-their-skills-contractors-are-beingtransferred-by-design-to-the-non-union/.
105. See S. REP. NO. 85-1684, at 27–30, 72 (1958).
106. Benjamin Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1121 (1960) (citing Plumbing Contractors Ass’n, 93 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1951)).
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Article does not contend that NLRB elections should never occur in the
construction industry, at least when the currently requisite percentage of
employees request an election or a union demands from an employer recognition
as a majority representative.107
The experience with NLRB elections in the construction industry from 1947
to 1959 was problematic. In 1951, the President of the AFL Building and
Construction Trades Department testified before Congress that “the entire
industry is being plunged into a completely chaotic relationship due primarily to
the [NLRA] election procedures . . . .”108 The subject of his testimony was a bill
to exempt the construction industry from the election provisions of the NLRA,
and that bill was also supported by the Associated General Contractors of
America, the National Electrical Contractors Association, and the Tile
Contractors Association of America.109 However, that bill was not reported out
of committee because of opposition from the CIO, the International Association
of Machinists (IAM), and the United Mine Workers (UMW).110 It might be
worth noting that this testimony occurred prior to the 1955 merger of the AFLCIO.111
The 1959 Congress, whose intent the Board claimed to be effectuating in its
2020 final Construction Union Proof Rule,112 recognized the difficulty with
applying NLRB election procedures in the construction industry. The Senate
Labor and Public Welfare Committee Report on the bill (S. 1555) that eventually
added Section 8(f) and other amendments to the LMRA stated that, because
construction was not covered from 1935–1947, “[c]oncepts evoked by the Board
therefore developed without reference to the construction industry” and that the
later “application of the [A]ct to the construction industry has given rise to
serious problems . . . .”113 After citing multiple hearings in which those problems
had been identified, the Report referred to the issues of NLRA application to
construction as “urgent problems.”114 This Report also stated that construction

107. But see Montgomery Ward & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 346, 347 (1962) (finding employer is
bound to its contractual commitment to not file an election petition even if the collective bargaining
agreement, because of its duration, would not bar an employee petition).
108. Benjamin Aaron, Amending the Taft-Hartley Act: A Decade of Frustration, 11 INDUS. &
LAB. RELS. REV. 327, 332 (1958) (quoting Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Labor and LaborManagement Relations of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 82d Cong. 39 (1951)
(statement of Richard Gray)).
109. Id.
110. The late institute director, Benjamin Aaron, explained that the CIO wanted the bill to do
more for maritime union hiring halls, and the IAM and the UMW were concerned about how the
proposed bill would affect their representation of employees in the construction industry. Id. at
332–33.
111. See Charlotte Garden, Union Made: Labor’s Litigation for Social Change, 88 TUL. L.
REV. 193, 206 (2013).
112. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
113. S. REP. NO. 86-187, at 27 (1959), as reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2317, 2344.
114. Id. at 28, as reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2344.

2020]

The Future of Construction (and Maybe All) Labor Law

125

is “markedly different from manufacturing and other types of enterprise[,]”
specifically because “[a]n individual employee typically works for many
employers and for none of them continuously” and “[j]obs are frequently of short
duration, depending upon various stages of construction.”115 The Report further
concluded that “[r]epresentation elections in a large segment of the industry are
not feasible to demonstrate such majority status due to the short periods of actual
employment . . . .”116
In this Report, the 1959 Senate committee made another observation that is
relevant to the Board’s 2020 Construction Union Proof Rule. The Report stated
that in the construction industry
the employer must be able to have available a supply of skilled
craftsmen ready for quick referral. A substantial majority of the skilled
employees in this industry constitute a pool of such help centered
about their appropriate craft union. If the employer relies upon this
pool of skilled craftsmen, members of the union, there is no doubt
under these circumstances that the union will in fact represent a
majority of the employees eventually hired.117
In 2020 and the foreseeable future, construction craft unions continue to
provide the skilled workers construction contractors need. This fact is a major
reason why contractors make agreements with such unions—and, when both the
contractor and union understand that the union will refer the contractor’s
workers, they agree that the union is the majority representative of those
workers. The union and the contractor’s employees rely on this commitment
from the contractor, and the Board should not make it easy for a contractor to
disavow the voluntary recognition at the heart of this commitment.
Given this history and congressional intent, it is not surprising that, only seven
years later, the Board adopted the position in Bricklayers & Masons
International Union Local No. 3 that when a construction union and contractor
renew an agreement, that renewed agreement is not based on Section 8(f) and is
therefore effectively equivalent to any Section 9(a) agreement, including being
subject to Section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3).118 As will be discussed in the next
paragraph, a few years later, in 1971, the Board expanded the kinds of facts
beyond renewal of a prior agreement that a construction union could use to prove
it had become a majority representative of a contractor’s employees. In its final
Construction Union Proof Rule, the Board did discuss some of the 1971 Board

115. Id. at 27, as reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2344.
116. Id. at 55, as reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2373.
117. Id. at 28, as reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2345.
118. Bricklayers & Masons Int’l Union Local No. 3, 162 N.L.R.B. 476, 478–79, enforced, 405
F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1968) (upholding the Board’s ruling that a union committed an unfair labor
practice when, while renewing an agreement, it insisted on a non-mandatory subject). This and
similar decisions were overruled more than 20 years later in Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. See
Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 977, 980 n.12 (1988).
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decisions,119 but never mentioned the 1966 Bricklayers & Masons International
Union Local No. 3 precedent holding that a renewal of a prior contractor-union
agreement can establish a union’s majority status. That oversight could be
significant if the current Board were to decide whether a contractor could
withdraw recognition from a union even after an initial agreement is renewed or
replaced by a succeeding one. The current Board will do exactly that if they
continue to agree with the same dissenting Board members they relied on in
issuing their final Construction Union Proof Rule.120
As noted earlier,121 the final Construction Union Proof Rule discussed how
the Board’s 1987 Deklewa decision overruled a so-called “conversion doctrine,”
which the Deklewa Board and the 2020 Board both traced to the Board’s 1971
decisions in R. J. Smith Construction Co.122 and Ruttmann Construction Co.123
The Board’s 1987 Deklewa decision was the first time it used the phrase
“conversion doctrine.”124 That 1987 Board, and the Board proposing the rule in
2019, both rightly stated that, in these 1971 decisions, the Board regarded a
union-contractor Section 8(f) agreement as “a preliminary step that contemplates
further action for the development of a full bargaining relationship.”125 In 1971
and until Deklewa, the Board did not require that “further action” to include the
union obtaining voluntary recognition or an NLRB election win.126 In the 1971
Ruttman decision, the Board stated that a union’s continued representation of
employees, so that the contractor remained bound to bargain with it, could be
legally validated by “the hiring of employees who are usually referred by the
union.”127 Also in that year, the Board added that majority status could be

119. See Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18368 (citing Ruttmann
Construction, 191 N.L.R.B. 701 (1971); R.J. Smith Construction Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971)).
120. See, e.g., Colo. Fire Sprinkler, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2016 NLRB LEXIS 543, at *18
(July 22, 2016) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting); King’s Fire Prot., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 1056,
1059–60 (2015) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part) (dissenting in both decisions from the
Board majority’s ruling that the contractor had unlawfully repudiated its relationship with the union
upon expiration of a successor agreement); Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18389–
90 (citing Member Miscimarra’s dissenting opinions).
121. See supra Section I.A.
122. R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 694–95 (1971), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
123. Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 706–08 (1971). See also Construction Union
Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18368; John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1377 (1987),
enforced sub nom. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB,
843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.).
124. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377. This Article’s author searched Board and NLRB
Administrative Law decisions prior to the date of the Deklewa decision (February 20, 1987) and
found no uses of the phrase “conversion doctrine.”
125. Id. at 1378 (quoting Ruttmann, 191 N.L.R.B. at 702); Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at
39935 (quoting Ruttmann, 191 N.L.R.B. at 702). The Board did make the same statement in its
final rule. See Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8.
126. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377–78.
127. Ruttmann, 191 N.L.R.B. at 702.
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proven by the fact that a contractor’s employees were union members bound by
a union-security clause.128
As this Article discussed previously,129 the Board in its 2019 proposed rule
and 2020 final rule relied on significant changes in the law governing
construction employer recognition of unions that were made in the Board’s 1987
Deklewa decision.130 Though the Board did not discuss it in either the 2019
Proposed Rule or 2020 final Construction Union Proof Rule, the Deklewa
majority also rejected the rule under R.J. Smith that a contractor could
unilaterally repudiate at any time any Section 8(f) relationship with a union that
did not convert to majority status,131 a rule the Deklewa Board called “simply
wrong.”132 The Board in Deklewa found that such a rule was “not a necessary
predicate for advancement of the employee free choice principles” and then
compared it to the Section 9(a) rules that prevail outside the construction
industry.133 The Deklewa Board pointed out that, with regard to nonconstruction agreements, “the Board effectuates employee free choice by
limiting the election bar effect of a contract to 3 years, but the irrebuttable
presumption of a union’s majority status and the enforceability of the contract
exist and continue for the contract’s full term.”134
In Deklewa, the Board did not fully apply this “irrebuttable presumption of
majority status” to Section 8(f) relationships, as the Board held that such
relationships would never bar election petitions.135 In practical terms, at least
for careful construction employee unions, these would be election petitions filed
by employees, as an employer cannot file an election petition unless a union
requests recognition as a majority representative.136 The Deklewa Board
described the appropriate “characterization” of the Section 8(f) “election”
128. Irvin, 194 N.L.R.B. 52, 53 (1971), enforced in part, denied in part 475 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.
1973).
129. See supra Section I.A.
130. See Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1377–78.
131. R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 694–95, 695 n.5 (1971), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1382 (quoting R.J. Smith, 191 N.L.R.B. at 694).
132. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1382.
133. Id.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 1377, 1379.
136. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 9(c)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B)
(“Whenever a petition shall have been filed . . . by an employer, alleging that one or more
individuals . . . have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in
subsection [9](a) . . . .”) (emphasis added); PSM Steel Constr., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1302, 1304
(1992) (finding that a union seeking an employer to sign a § 8(f) agreement does not support an
employer’s petition for an election). The Board in Deklewa did say that an employer filing an
“RM” election “need only demonstrate that it is signatory to an 8(f) agreement to satisfy the
‘objective considerations’ requirement.” Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1385 n.42. However, that does
not change the fact that, under the statutory language, an employer can file a petition only when a
union claims to be the 9(a) majority representative.
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proviso as “it[s] operat[ion] as an ‘escape hatch’ for employees subject to
unwanted representation imposed before they were hired.”137 In the same
paragraph, the Deklewa Board added its view that “Congress specified that an
8(f) agreement may not act as a bar to, inter alia, decertification or rival union
petitions.”138 The Board reinforced this in another part of the decision when it
stated, “an 8(f) union is not a stranger to the employees. Rather, it is usually the
initial employment referral source for most of the employees the employer hires.
In any event, if the employees subsequently decide to reject that representative,
the contract will not stand in their way.”139 Thus, the Board in Deklewa provided
much stronger indication that “employee choice” was to be carried out by
employees, and not by unilateral contractor action, than it did of how a union
could obtain Section 9(a) status.
The Board in Deklewa arguably did not apply these insights about the meaning
and intent of Section 8(f) when it held that, while a contractor could no longer
unilaterally repudiate a Section 8(f) relationship with a union during the term of
an agreement, it could do so after the agreement expired.140 The Deklewa Board
did so even though it recognized that “an employer’s decision to repudiate may
be based on the employer’s own economic considerations, without reference to
or concern for the employees’ desire to continue the status quo.”141 The Board
immediately followed this recognition by stating—again referring to employeesought elections—that “[e]ven if the employer has a legitimate question as to its
employees’ representational desires, Congress has expressly provided an
electoral mechanism for testing them.”142 In Deklewa, the Board’s only
rationale for allowing a contractor, at contract expiration, to end a relationship
with a union that its employees might want was that otherwise the union “could
lawfully seek to compel the employer, through strikes or picketing” to agree to
a successor contract,143 which the Board found would be contrary to
congressional intent expressed in legislative history.144 That reasoning hardly
seems the most straightforward way to establish rules that meet congressional
intent to avoid “compelled” Section 8(f) agreements while also serving actual
“employee choice” in the construction industry. A contractor’s unilateral
repudiation of a relationship with a union serves only itself and does nothing for
employee choice except that it often undermines the choice of employees then
working for the contractor. That aspect of Deklewa furthers only contractor
137. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1381.
138. Id. at 1382.
139. Id. at 1387 n.52 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
140. See id. at 1377–79, 1382–83.
141. Id. at 1382.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1384.
144. Id. at 1384–85, 1385 n.39 (“The Conference Report on the 1959 amendments . . . states
that ‘[n]othing in [Section 8(f)] is intended . . . to authorize the use of force, coercion, strikes, or
picketing to compel any person to enter into such [8(f)] agreements.”) (alterations in original).
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choice, including with respect to the source of its entire workforce, and the
Board’s final Construction Union Proof Rule would only increase contractor
opportunities to make that unilateral choice.
In its 2020 final Construction Union Proof Rule, the Board has overruled its
prior 2001 decision in Staunton Fuel.145 The Board in Staunton Fuel found that,
after Deklewa, the way in which a union could obtain majority status was still
unresolved.146 After concluding—probably correctly—that the Board had not
yet decided what kind of evidence a construction union could use to prove
Section 9(a) majority status, the Board considered the issue. It discussed its
language from Pierson Electric, Inc., and other past decisions, which was also
quoted in the 2019 Proposed Rule: “a construction union can overcome the
presumption of 8(f) status by showing that it made an unequivocal demand for,
and that the employer unequivocally granted, majority recognition based on a
showing of majority support in the unit.”147 The Board then adopted the
standard—applied for almost twenty years during two Republican and one
Democratic presidential administrations—that it ultimately overruled in 2020.148
B. The Possible Future
In considering the possible future regarding employee representation in the
construction industry, it is valuable to take account of how central the choices
of the contractor, not its employees, are in the process. When one or more
construction employees choose to be represented by a union, that union does not
yet represent them, at least with regard to any specific employer/contractor. If,
however, the contractor that employs them chooses to make an agreement with
a construction union, that union will become their representative. The contractor
also chooses whether it will recognize the construction union as its employees’
majority representative or make a Section 8(f) agreement with the union that
does not require majority support. If the contractor chooses the latter, then its
employees could petition for an NLRB election that would determine if the
union remains their representative. But if the employees don’t do that—and they
rarely do—then it will again be the contractor that decides for its employees
when the Section 8(f) contract expires. At that time, the contractor could choose
to repudiate its relationship with the union so that its employees no longer have

145. Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 39938–39 (discussing Staunton Fuel & Material, Inc.,
335 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001)); Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18368–69, 18393
(indicating Board’s adoption of this feature of its proposed rule).
146. Staunton Fuel, 335 N.L.R.B. at 718–19.
147. Id. (citing W. Pipeline, Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. 925 (1999); James Julian, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B.
1247 (1993); Pierson Elec., Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1992)); see also Proposed Rule, supra note
27, at 39935 n.30 (quoting Pierson Elec., 307 N.L.R.B. at 1495). The Board in its final rule did
not quote or cite Pierson Electric or any of these decisions. See Construction Union Proof Rule,
supra note 8.
148. See Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18366, 18370.
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any representation and, in many cases, will no longer be employed by that
contractor.
When the contractor makes the choice about its employees’ union
representation, the contractor is also usually choosing who its employees will be
and where they will come from. As mentioned in the Introduction, the contractor
chooses the source of its employees in the construction industry.
The Board’s Construction Union Proof Rule is aimed at contractorconstruction union agreements with particular language that, for nearly twenty
years, has been found to establish a Section 9(a) relationship between the two,
which the contractor cannot repudiate when the term of that contract ends. The
Board’s Construction Union Proof Rule would restore that choice of repudiation
to the contractor, which could simultaneously make a choice about what workers
it will employ and how and from where they will be hired. In return, employees
who have indicated their support of the union as a representative (and often will
be union members referred by the union) would get a rarely exercised
opportunity to petition immediately for an election on whether to keep the
contract terms they have been working under, and to keep union representation,
instead of having to wait nearly the duration of a contract, or nearly up to three
years, to petition for such an election. If lost by the union, that election would
again create “choices” for the contractor: what terms its employees will work
under, and what employees it will hire and retain. Those choices create risks for
construction employees. The Board’s Construction Union Proof Rule merely
makes available for them a chance to get an election that risks their employment
terms and jobs. One cannot help but wonder what “choice” actual construction
employees would make if the Board’s rule were offered to them in an “up or
down” vote.
Given that the Board, in its invitation for briefs in Loshaw Thermal
Technology, stated that the respondent contractor wanted the Board to “revisit”
its 1993 Casale Industries rule on the limitations period for a contractor to
withdraw recognition from union, and the Board’s final rule overruled Casale
Industries,149 it seems reasonable to infer that the Board plans to make that
choice available to contractors as well. If the Board did so, that would mean that
if a contractor renewed or made any agreement with a union, no matter what that
agreement said, the contractor could try to later claim that it had only a Section
8(f) relationship with the union and was not obligated to bargain with the union
or treat that union as the representative of its employees (whomever they might
turn out to be) after the 8(f) agreement expires. The contractor could make that
claim even if the union had in fact shown the contractor that a majority of its
employees wanted the union to represent them, because the burden would be on
the union to prove that. Will signatures of a majority of employees on
authorization cards be sufficient to prove that? What if the employer disputes
the authenticity of such signatures—what standard will be used in that instance?
149. See id. at 18391.
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It is unknown what standards the Board or courts will apply to such issues in the
future, and the Board gave no indication in its 2020 Construction Union Proof
Rule.
The D.C. Circuit decisions the Board relied on in its rule demonstrate what
might happen. In both Nova Plumbing and Colorado Fire Sprinkler, the D.C.
Circuit allowed the contractors to withdraw recognition from the union.150 In
the latter decision, the court allowed this result even though it recognized that
Colorado Fire Sprinkler, beginning in 1994 and continuing until it withdrew its
relationship with the union in 2013, hired its sprinkler fitters “primarily through
the [u]nion’s apprenticeship program . . . .”151 The union’s referral of
apprentices certainly ended when Colorado Fire Sprinkler ended their
relationship. The “choices” of the “employees” whom the union otherwise
would have referred were certainly not served by the court’s decision.
It is less clear whether employee choice was served or not in Nova Plumbing,
given that, as discussed in Section II.B, there was evidence that, at the time of
its withdrawal of recognition, a majority of Nova Plumbing’s employees did not
support the union as a representative.152 With those facts, Nova Plumbing can
perhaps be regarded as an instance of “bad facts making bad law,” at least to the
extent it led to the Board’s final Construction Union Proof Rule. In any event,
although both Nova Plumbing and Colorado Fire Sprinkler discuss employee
choice, they also can be regarded as decisions that were based on the fact that
the union did not comply with the terms of the agreement on which it based its
claim of Section 9(a) status. In Nova Plumbing, as discussed in Section I.A, the
agreement said the union would have its majority status verified by a Certified
Public Accounting Firm, and that never happened.153 “Verification” was also an
issue for the union in Colorado Fire Sprinkler, as the form agreements it relied
on stated that the contractor “freely and unequivocally acknowledge[d] that it
ha[d] verified the Union’s status as the exclusive bargaining representative of its
employees pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act.”154 The
D.C. Circuit called the language in which the contractor acknowledged the
union’s majority status “demonstrably false in at least one prior iteration”155
(apparently when the contractor was party to the agreement it had no employees,
from 1991 until sometime in 1994) and the court found “at no point in the
administrative record did the Union even explain, let alone proffer, what
evidence it claimed to have collected” of its majority status.156 There was no
150. See Colo. Fire Sprinkler, Inc. v. NLRB, 891 F.3d 1031, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Nova
Plumbing, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.3d 531, 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
151. Colo. Fire Sprinkler, 891 F.3d at 1036.
152. Nova Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 536–37.
153. Id. at 535.
154. Colo. Fire Sprinkler, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2016 NLRB LEXIS 543, at *47 (July 22,
2016).
155. Colo. Fire Sprinkler, 891 F.3d at 1040.
156. Id. at 1041.
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evidence in the record that the employer saw and verified evidence of the union’s
majority status.157
It was this lack of evidence demonstrating union majority status that the D.C.
Circuit found to be key in Colorado Fire Sprinkler. The union probably could
have shown the employer that it had majority support at any point in their
relationship after 1994, but apparently did not, as the court stated that “[t]he
record is bereft of evidence either confirming or controverting majority support.
In the Company’s twenty-year history, there were no petitions, authorization
cards, or votes confirming or denying the Union’s majority status. No anecdotal
evidence was offered either.”158 The court made it clear that this lack of
evidence was crucial by stating, “what matters is that the affirmative evidence
of majority support exists in the record.”159 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit’s view,
based on its most recent precedent on this issue, is that Staunton Fuel contract
language plus evidence (such as authorization cards) that the union was in fact
supported by a majority of the contractor’s employees, is sufficient to prove
Section 9(a) status and prevent the employer from withdrawing from its
relationship with the union.160 It can only be hoped that the current Board will
not demand more from unions than this standard does.
In Colorado Fire Sprinkler, the court said that “[t]he unusual Section 8(f)
exception is meant not to cede all employee choice to the employer or union,”
but the court’s ruling gave the choice entirely to the contractor.161 None of that
contractor’s employees, whether apprentices referred by the union or other
employees, played any part in what the contractor chose to do. One rationale
the court gave for this holding was to avoid “collusion” between the contractor
and the union to preclude petitions from rival unions or to get rid of the union.162
The court did not mention that, in cases where it allows the contractor to walk
away or otherwise withdraw recognition, as it did Colorado Fire Sprinkler, the
court rewards one of the colluders. A contractor must always go along with such
collusion or it does not happen. In fact—as this Article has argued
consistently—the contractor gets its “choice” at all times. When it wants an
agreement for a source of labor (as Colorado Fitter Sprinkler did when it was
founded and had no sprinkler fitters), the contractor makes an agreement with a
union. When the contractor, for any reason—Colorado Sprinkler Fitter claimed
it was due to increased competition—wants to end its relationship with a union,
it can make that choice too. Neither the D.C Circuit, nor anyone else, has ever
explained how allowing a colluder to get its way at all times will reduce the
incentive for collusion.
157. Id. at 1040.
158. Id. As noted earlier, the court found that the contractor hired primarily union apprentices
as sprinkler fitters from 1994–2013. See id. at 1036.
159. Id. at 1039.
160. Id. at 1039–40.
161. Id. at 1038.
162. Id. at 1039, 1041.
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One long-recognized limit on when contractors can renege on an agreement
with a union, based on challenging the union’s majority status and claiming that
the presumption of a Section 8(f) relationship applies, is the 1993 Casale
Industries rule that such a challenge will not be allowed more than six months
after the contractor has recognized the union as a Section 9(a) majority
representative.163 At least for the purposes of representation cases, the Board
overruled Casale Industries, and the way in which the Board did so is worth
considering. As this Article discussed previously, the Board’s 2018 invitation
for briefs in the unfair labor practice/withdrawal of recognition case, Loshaw
Thermal Technology, asked whether the Board should reconsider Casale
Industries and “revise” its rule from that decision.164 However, as was also
stated earlier in this Article, the Board did not mention Casale Industries in its
August 2019 proposed election protection rule.165 Then, ostensibly in response
to a commenter who asked the Board to retain the Casale Industries time limit
on challenging majority support,166 the Board’s final Construction Union Proof
Rule declared that it “overrule[d] Casale to the extent that it is inconsistent with
the instant rule.”167 The Board thus ignored the “notice” part of “notice-andcomment rulemaking,” which alone could serve as a ground for invalidating this
part of its final rule.168 After all, in response to the commenters the Board could
simply have stopped after stating, as it did at the outset of discussing Casale
Industries, “we decline to adopt a Section 10(b) 6-month limitation on
challenging a construction-industry union’s majority status by filing a petition .
. . .”169 That would have been consistent with the Board’s treatment of many
other issues raised by commenters, which the Board explained it would address
in future cases, as necessary.170 It was also unusual that the Board made this
163. See Casale Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 951, 953 (1993).
164. See supra Section I.A.
165. See supra Section I.A.
166. See, e.g., Robert D. Kurnick on behalf of North America’s Building Trades Unions,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Representation—Case Procedures: Election Bars; Proof of
Majority Support in Construction Industry Collective Bargaining Relationships 19–21 (Jan. 9,
2020), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NLRB-2019-0001-0107 (discussing consistent
application of Section 10(b) six-month limitations period in construction industry cases).
167. Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18391.
168. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“If the final rule
deviates too sharply from the proposal, affected parties will be deprived of notice and an
opportunity to respond to the proposal.”) (quoting Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v.
EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir.1983)). The U.S. Supreme Court has never upheld an agency’s
rule on the ground that the rule adopted is a “logical outgrowth” of the rule proposed. See Jack M.
Beermann, Rethinking Notice, 39 ADMIN. & REGUL. L. NEWS 12, 13 (2014) (mentioning that “in
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007), the Court cited the ‘logical
outgrowth’ test with apparent approval,” but failed to mention that in that case the agency withdrew
the proposed rule) .
169. Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18391.
170. Id. at 18393. Nor could the Board’s decision to overrule Casale be justified by the Board
wanting to protect the “employee choice” for a petition in which the 6-month time period had
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major change to a labor law rule, a rule eight years older than the one in Staunton
Fuel, in its response to comments, and did not mention it in its “Summary of
Changes to the Proposed Rule,” where it did bother to mention “minor, nonsubstantive changes” to this part of its rule.171 Why did the Board take this
approach to the Casale Industries rule?
Perhaps because, for the Casale Industries time limit, the Board had in mind
a goal other than responding to commenters. After the sentence stating that it
“overruled” Casale, the Board added, “[s]pecifically, we overrule Casale’s
holding that the Board will not entertain a claim that majority status was lacking
at the time of recognition where a construction-industry employer extends 9(a)
recognition to a union and 6 months elapse without a petition.”172 The reference
to “not entertain[ing] a claim” six months after recognition certainly indicated
application to unfair labor practice cases.173 Next, perhaps recalling the limited
scope of its final Construction Union Proof Rule, the Board did note, but only
“[a]s an initial matter,” that “Section 10(b) applies only to unfair labor practices
and that this aspect of the rule addresses only representation proceedings—i.e.,
whether an election petition is barred because a construction-industry employer
and union formed a 9(a) rather than an 8(f) collective-bargaining
relationship.”174
After that, the Board returned to its likely goal regarding the Casale time limit
rule—which does involve unfair labor practice cases—and discussed two federal
courts of appeals decisions and past Board members’ opinions that questioned
or refused to apply the six month time limit to contractor withdrawals of
recognition of a union in unfair labor practice cases.175 Thus, the Board could
hardly have been more obvious in signaling its intentions for future unfair labor
elapsed, because the Board, in its final rule, announced that it would apply “only prospectively”
and “only to construction-industry bargaining relationships entered into on or after the date the rule
goes into effect.” Id. at 18390.
171. Id. at 18370.
172. Id. at 18391.
173. See id.
174. Id. Near the end of the part of the Board’s final rule in which it responded to comments
calling for a 6-month time limit, the Board returned to discussing election petitions. Id. The Board
first found that Casale should not be applied to election petitions because “employees and rival
unions will likely presume that a construction-industry employer and union entered an 8(f)
collective-bargaining agreement” and therefore would not file a petition within a 6-month period.
Id. What employees and “rival unions” would presume is obviously a matter of pure speculation.
More could be said about what employees and rival unions in the construction industry would likely
presume, and why, but that is beyond the scope of this Article. In this part of its rule, the Board’s
other reason for rejecting the Casale 6-month limit was another invocation of the “employee
choice” rationale, which it has claimed as the basis for everything in the rule since it proposed
overruling Staunton Fuel. Id. Much of this Article is devoted to explaining why that is almost
certainly a false claim and that it is unlikely that they will file a petition challenging the union’s
status within 6 months of recognition.
175. Id. (citing Nova Plumbing, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.3d 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Am.
Automatic Sprinkler Sys. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 209, 218 n.6 (4th Cir. 1998)).
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practice cases when a construction contractor withdraws recognition from a
union more than six months after that same contractor recognized the union as a
majority representative. This intention regarding “contractor choice” is all the
more clear when one takes into account the Board’s 2018 Loshaw Technology
invitation for briefs, in which the Board, in a contractor withdrawal of
recognition case, requested views on whether it should “revisit” the Casale
Industries time limit rule.176
For many reasons, the Board should not follow through with this previewed
plan. First, as was discussed earlier regarding “collusion,”177 the Board will
most likely allow withdrawal of recognition in a case involving one of the
“colluders”—the contractor that previously recognized the union as a majority
representative—as was true in the Loshaw Thermal Technology case.178
Presuming that this contractor will also stop obtaining its employees from union
referrals, it would be unbelievable if the Board claimed that “employee choice”
is served when a contractor that illegally recognized a union as a majority
representative of its employees later relied on its mistaken and unlawful
recognition to terminate its relationship with that union. Any and all Board
decisions allowing such withdrawals of recognition by construction contractors
would plainly serve the “choices” of those contractors much more directly and
fully than any employee’s choice on representation.
Second, in Casale Industries the Board simply decided that, in the
construction industry, it would apply the same rule as the Supreme Court had
affirmed for all other covered industries: that a claim that an employer granted
unlawful recognition to a union as a majority representative must be brought
within the six-month period for filing a charge of an unfair labor practice.179 The
Board in Casale rightly added that “[a] contrary rule would mean that
longstanding relationships would be vulnerable to attack, and stability in labor
relations would be undermined.”180 The point about stable labor relations is
important: promoting such “labor relations stability,” along with “employee [ ]
choice,” was identified by the Deklewa Board as one of the two “fundamental
statutory objectives” and “overarching objectives” of the NLRA.181 Yet the
Board in its final Construction Union Proof Rule, while repeatedly invoking
“employee choice” as the reason underlying the rule, only mentioned labor
relations stability in a conclusory assertion that it “will restore the proper balance
of interests—employee free choice on one hand, labor relations stability on the

176. See Invitation, supra note 13, at 1.
177. See supra Section II.B.
178. See Loshaw Thermal Tech., LLC, No. 05-CA-158650, 2016 NLRB LEXIS 493, at *24–
26 (N.L.R.B. July 7, 2016).
179. Casale Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 951, 953 (1993) (citing Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v.
NLRB (Bryan Mfg.), 362 U.S. 411 (1960)).
180. Id. (citing Bryan Mfg., 362 U.S. at 429).
181. John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1380, 1382 (1987).
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other—intended by Congress and safeguarded in Deklewa.”182 The only serious
consideration of labor relations stability was by the dissenting board member
when the Board proposed the rule.183
There are other reasons why the Casale Industries rule should be retained to
limit any claims, by a contractor or anyone else, that a union did not and does
not have majority status. As the Supreme Court recognized in International
Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB (Bryan Manufacturing), Congress itself said
enacting the Section 10(b) six month limit was to ensure litigation did not occur
“after records have been destroyed, witnesses have gone elsewhere, and
recollections of the events in question have become dim and confused.”184
Especially given that local union officers must be elected every three years,185—
and, for some contractors, there is also turnover in personnel—the risks
Congress recognized are definitely present when an employer waits for more
than six months, or even years, prior to breaking its relationship with a union
and claiming it lacks majority status. The Deklewa Board also recognized this
issue and raised it as a ground for rejecting the “conversion doctrine” that
required determining if a union had majority support in the past:
[T]he Board [must] “look back” any number of years into a
relationship characterized by sporadic and shifting employment
patterns to determine whether the union, at any time, enjoyed majority
support. This determination must be made in adversarial litigation
based on such factors as union membership rolls, the presence of an
enforced union-security clause, exclusive hiring hall referrals, or
union fringe benefit contribution records. The documentary evidence
of such factors is often incomplete, contradictory, or unavailable. In
those situations, the crucial determination may be made on the basis
of individual recollections as to employees’ representational wishes
years previously.186
As mentioned previously, the Board referenced two federal appellate court
decisions, permitting employer withdrawals of recognition, to support its
overruling of Casale Industries.187 The first of those two decisions was by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in American Automatic Sprinkler
Systems, Inc. v. NLRB.188 In footnote six of that decision, the court discussed
the Board’s contention that the contractor’s withdrawal of recognition was
182. See Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 13839.
183. Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 39940 (Member McFerran, dissenting).
184. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB (Bryan Mfg.), 362 U.S. 411, 419 (1960) (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 80-245, at 40 (1947)).
185. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959 §401(b), 29 U.S.C. § 481(b).
186. Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1383. See also Overstreet ex rel. NLRB v. Tucson Ready Mix,
Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1147 (D. Ariz. 1998) (applying a six-month limit to a successor employer
defense to withdrawing recognition).
187. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
188. Am. Automatic Sprinkler Sys. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1998).
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untimely under Casale and rejected it for the rather conclusory reason that “the
basis for applying a 10(b) limitations period in the nonconstruction industry
workplace, where minority recognition is unlawful, does not hold in the
construction industry, where there is no statutory prohibition on minority
recognition.”189
Interestingly, in the next sentence, the Fourth Circuit observed that “in the
nonconstruction industries, a defense of invalid voluntary recognition is
tantamount to a charge of unlawful conduct under the NLRA provisions
prohibiting employers and nonmajority unions from entering into collectivebargaining agreements.”190 The Fourth Circuit proceeded on the mistaken
premise that a contractor’s recognition of a minority union is not unlawful,
overlooking that it violates Section 8(a)(2) if and when a contractor agrees that
a union is the “majority” or “Section 9(a)” representative of a union, as is true
in any case where the Staunton Fuel standard is relevant.191 Thus when a
contractor agrees a union is a majority representative of its employees, as
American Automatic Sprinkler Systems did,192 it violates Section 8(a)(2) if the
union does not actually represent a majority, as American Automatic Sprinkler
Systems later claimed the union did not.193 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court
established in Garment Workers’194—a decision the Board relied on multiple
times in its final Construction Union Proof Rule195—that there is no scienter
requirement in Section 8(a)(2), so it does not matter whether the employer knew
the union lacked majority support.196 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit should have
found that the Section 10(b) period began to run when American Automatic
Sprinkler Systems agreed that the union was a majority representative, which
would have been consistent with the rule in Bryan Manufacturing and other non-

189. Id. at 218 n.6 (quoting Triple A Fire Prot., Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 1088, 1089 n.3 (1993)
(Member Devaney, concurring)).
190. Id.
191. See Marin Chatmar, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. 68, 70 (1971) (finding that an executed agreement
to recognize a union as representing a majority of employees was an 8(a)(2) violation because the
union did not yet represent a majority when the agreement was executed); Butler Knitting Mills,
Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 68, 81 (1960); Marcus Trucking Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1109 (1960) (finding
an 8(a)(2) violation where employer treated Teamsters union as majority representative in
interactions with employees prior to that union attaining majority support), enforced 286 F.2d 583
(2d Cir. 1961). An employer accepting in a collective bargaining agreement with a union that the
union is a majority (or §9(a)) representative of employees might be especially significant as it
relates to preventing interference with employee rights because any employee represented by a
union has the right to review that union’s collective bargaining agreements with an employer. See
29 U.S.C. § 414.
192. Am. Automatic Sprinkler, 163 F.3d at 212.
193. See id. at 214.
194. Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
195. See Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18369, 18389, 18391–92.
196. Garment Workers, 366 U.S. at 739.
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construction cases.197 In failing to do so, the Fourth Circuit disregarded its own
insight that nothing “suggest[s] . . . Congress intended in any way to
disadvantage construction industry employees in their attempts to organize or
bargain collectively.”198 The Board also mentioned this insight in its final
Construction Union Proof Rule, citing Deklewa, but seems to have disregarded
it in overruling Casale.199
The other federal appeals court decision that the Board relied on in overruling
Casale was the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Nova Plumbing.200 However, the
discussion of Casale in that decision was clearly dicta, as the court expressly
stated, “we need not resolve this [Casale time limit] issue, for the Board did not
rely on section 10(b) and ‘we cannot sustain agency action on grounds other than
those adopted by the agency in the administrative proceedings.’”201 It should
nonetheless be noted that both the Board, in its final Construction Union Proof
Rule, and the D.C. Circuit, in Nova Plumbing, referenced the Board’s pre-Casale
decision, Brannan Sand & Gravel Co.,202 to support the possible proposition that
the Section 10(b) limit should not apply to the question of whether the
contractor-union relationship had been established under Section 8(f) or Section
9(a).203 In its final Construction Union Proof Rule, the Board quoted the same
language from Brannan that the D.C. Circuit did, but continued the quote by
noting that Brannan stated that the nature of the relationship “does not involve
a determination that any conduct was unlawful.”204 However, as explained
immediately before, if a contractor prevailed in a withdrawal of recognition case
in which the union claimed the contractor had recognized the union as a majority
representative, that usually would prove that the contractor had acted unlawfully
under Section 8(a)(2) in granting such recognition.205 In its final Construction
Union Proof Rule, the Board instead treated the claim that a contractor
197. See Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18391 (discussing Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists v. NLRB (Bryan Mfg.), 362 U.S. 411 (1960)).
198. Am. Automatic Sprinkler, 163 F.3d at 218.
199. See Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18368. The Board relied on its 1987
Deklewa decision in stating “nothing . . . [was] meant to suggest that unions have less favored
status with respect to construction[-]industry employers” specifically regarding that “a union could
achieve 9(a) status through ‘voluntary recognition . . . .’” Id. (quoting John Deklewa & Sons, Inc.,
282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1387 n.53 (1987)) (alterations in original).
200. Nova Plumbing, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
201. Id. at 539 (quoting MacMillan Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 194 F.3d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir.1999)).
202. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 977, 982 (1988). See supra notes 38–40 and
accompanying text.
203. In Nova Plumbing, the D.C. Circuit’s dicta included a parenthetical quoting Brannan Sand
& Gravel’s statement that “[g]oing back to the beginning of the parties’ relationship here simply
seeks to determine the majority or nonmajority based nature of the current relationship . . . .” Nova
Plumbing, 330 F.3d at 539 (quoting Brannan, 289 N.L.R.B. at 982). The Board’s discussion of
Brannan in its final rule is discussed in text. See infra notes 204–207 and accompanying text.
204. Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18391 (quoting Brannan, 289 N.L.R.B.
at 982).
205. Id.
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unlawfully repudiated a Section 9(a) relationship as the only possible illegality
at issue when a contractor withdraws recognition from a union.206 As a result,
the Board declared that “Casale begs the question by assuming the very 9(a)
status that ought to be the object of inquiry.”207
The Casale rule and decision actually do no such thing, while what the Board
did in its final Construction Union Proof Rule was to “split hairs” to make an
argument that is based on how a withdrawal of recognition case is characterized.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Bryan Manufacturing, rejected a similar argument.
The NLRB General Counsel in that case tried to argue that a union-security
clause was unlawful because, more than six months prior to the filing of charges
(ten months and twelve months, to be exact), the employer and union had made
an agreement when the union did not represent a majority of the employer’s
employees.208 As in a contractor withdrawal of recognition case, the central
issue in this unfair labor practice case was whether the union represented a
majority of an employer’s employees at the time it was recognized as a majority
representative.209 Contrary to the Board’s suggestion in its final Construction
Union Proof Rule, the Supreme Court did not decide that it was permissible to
“look back” before the Section 10(b) period to determine if the union was a
minority union, so that its union security clause was unlawful within the Section
10(b) period.210 The Supreme Court instead held that the Section 10(b) time-bar
precluded examining the union’s majority status.211 Thus, the Board in Casale
Industries was not “begging any questions,” but was adopting a rule consistent
with Bryan Manufacturing and Section 10(b)’s purposes of preventing
litigation—on a case’s central issue of whether a union recognized by an

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists (Bryan Mfg.) v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 414–15 (1960).
209. Id. at 412–14.
210. See Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18391.
211. Bryan Mfg., 362 U.S. at 416–17. The Supreme Court also did note in Bryan
Manufacturing that “earlier events may be utilized to shed light on the true character of matters
occurring within the limitations period; and for that purpose § 10(b) ordinarily does not bar such
evidentiary use of anterior events.” Id. at 416 (citing Axelson Mfg. Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 761, 766
(1950)). The Court’s citation to Axelson Manufacturing, 88 N.L.R.B. 761 (1950), strongly
indicates that such evidence can be used when it supports that conduct within the Section 10(b)
period was an unfair labor practice by, for example, clarifying a party’s intent during the Section
10(b) period. See, e.g., Shumate v. NLRB, 452 F.2d 717, 719 (4th Cir. 1971) (finding that preSection 10(b) actions of charged party union “illuminate[d]” its motives in actions taken against
members/employees); see also 11 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR LABOR RELATIONS § 42:261,
Westlaw (database updated April 2020) (stating that in NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings
evidence from prior to the §10(b) period is admissible “if the evidence concerns the object sought
to be achieved by the respondent’s activity, events considered did not take place at a time so remote
that there is a risk that the evidence has lost its probative value, and there has been no intervening
change of circumstances which might undermine the NLRB’s inference that the objective
manifested by the antecedent conduct continues unchanged”).
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employer was supported by a majority of employees at the time of recognition—
based on stale and questionable evidence.212
If the current Board ignores the points made above, and overrules Casale in
an unfair labor practice case involving withdrawal of recognition, it would
increase the opportunities for contractor choice enormously. The contractor
would have an unlimited time within which to withdraw from its relationship
with a union. It could also “time” that withdrawal to rely on union-provided
labor as long as needed, and it could choose to break its relationship with the
union at any time it chose for any reason that served its interests or even its
whim. In Colorado Fire Sprinkler, for example, the contractor made an
agreement with the union in 1991, shortly after its founding, when it needed
sprinkler fitters.213 The contractor kept relying on union labor for nearly ten
years, and then repudiated its relationship with the union when it decided to save
costs, purportedly because of “increased competition,” which any contractor
could claim.214 As mentioned earlier, none of this contractor’s actions were
based on “employee choice” or preference.215 The current Board’s decision to
overrule Casale in representation—and the likelihood that it will do the same in
unfair labor practice cases if given the opportunity to do so—creates “contractor
choice on steroids,” and also makes even more clear that it is the choice of the
contractor in which the Board is truly interested.
212. See discussion of Bryan Manufacturing’s reliance on Section 10(b) purposes supra note
211.
213. Colo. Fire Sprinkler, Inc. v. NLRB, 891 F.3d 1031, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The contractor
initially entered into a form agreement, prior to hiring any sprinkler fitters, that stated that the union
was the representative of its sprinkler fitters and that the contractor “acknowledge[d] and
confirm[ed]” this was so. Id. The Board, responding to commentators in its 2020 final rule, stated
that this language in the pre-hire agreement in Colorado Fire Sprinkler, and the same or similar
language in other pre-hire agreements when the contractor did not yet have any employees,
“falsified majority support” and is an example of employer-union “collusion.” Construction Union
Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18390. See also discussion supra note 82 (discussing this part of the
Board’s final rule). Those characterizations are unfair. Both “falsify” and “collude” imply an effort
to deceive one or more persons, but that was not true of any of the agreements cited by the Board.
The contractor who agreed to recognition language certainly knew it did not have any employees,
and the union obviously knew also. The recognition clause in each case was intended to define the
representational status of the contractor’s employees after the union referred them, from a hiring
hall or otherwise. The union would require that as a condition of making the agreement with the
contractor, which the contractor was free to accept or decline. The union was similarly free to make
an agreement with a contractor under Section 8(f) without a recognition clause if it chose. Nor
were any employees deceived, as long as the contractor abided by the agreement and hired
employees referred by the union. Thus, as soon as the contractor hired any employees, the
agreement would be completely truthful and accurate. Perhaps “future recognition” language
would be more facially accurate, but it is not yet clear that the current Board will accept that either.
See discussion infra note 225 and accompanying text.
214. Colo. Fire Sprinkler, 891 F.3d at 1036–37. The Board in Colorado Fire Sprinkler had
decided that it was unnecessary to consider or rely on Casale Industries, and perhaps for that reason
the D.C. Circuit did not mention Casale. See generally id.; Colo. Fire Sprinkler, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B.
No. 55, 2016 NLRB. LEXIS 543, at *4 (July 22, 2016).
215. See supra Section II.B.
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The Board’s overruling of Casale likely marks a key step in realizing the
current Board’s plans for construction labor law, as earlier indicated by its
invitation for briefs in Loshaw Thermal Technology216 and its Construction
Union Proof Rule.217 The Board apparently wants to enable all contractors in
union agreements in which the contractor has agreed the union represents a
majority of its employees, or that the union has offered to show it represents
such a majority, to choose to flout what that contractor has agreed to and to
disregard the commitments it contractually made to the union and its unionrepresented employees. The Board apparently wants such contractors to be able
to ignore contractual commitments with impunity as no other parties to contracts
can, including employers who declare bankruptcy.218
It remains to be seen whether the Board will further expand the choices
available to contractors by overlooking or distinguishing the precedent of the
D.C Circuit in M & M Backhoe, in turn based on a U.S. Supreme Court ruling
in Gissel Packing, that if the contractor has agreed to recognize the union
because the union has offered to show its majority support, the contractor cannot
withdraw recognition from the union just because it “never took the union up on
its offer.”219 Also unknown is whether the Board will try to distinguish its more
than fifty years of precedent holding that, in the construction industry, if the
contractor has reviewed the union’s proof of majority support and agreed that
the union has majority status, the contractor cannot later repudiate its
relationship with that union.220 It cannot be predicted whether or not the Board
will disagree even with the D.C. Circuit court decisions it relied on in overruling
Staunton Fuel, and hold that even evidence in the record that the union did have
majority support at a relevant time is insufficient to prevent a contractor from
withdrawing recognition from the union.221
In its Construction Union Proof Rule, the Board included language about a
“contemporaneous showing of support from a majority of employees in an
appropriate unit” as being required to block a representation petition,222 but it
rejected a commenters’ proposal that this same requirement should apply to all

216. See supra text accompanying note 13 (discussing Board’s invitation for briefs in that
case).
217. See supra notes 163–171 and accompanying text (discussing the Board’s Proposed Rule).
218. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (establishing the process an employer in bankruptcy must follow to
reject a collective bargaining agreement).
219. M & M Backhoe Serv. v. NLRB, 469 F.3d 1047, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2006). See supra text
accompanying note 77 (discussing M & M Backhoe and its reliance on Gissel Packing).
220. See, e.g., Island Constr. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 13, 14–16 (1962); see also John Deklewa &
Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1387 n.53 (citing Island Constr. Co. with approval); Pierson Elec.,
Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1494 (1992) (applying this rule in a construction industry case decided by
a Board that was unanimously appointed by Republican presidents).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 150–155 (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s application of
this standard in Nova Plumbing and Colorado Fire Sprinkler).
222. Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8, at 18366 (emphasis added).
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industries.223 The Board therefore cannot apply this “contemporaneous
showing” requirement to unfair labor practice cases involving withdrawal of
recognition because that would involve disregarding the congressional intent
that unions and employees in the construction industry not be disadvantaged
with regard to voluntary recognition.224 The Board, therefore, should continue
to abide by its more than twenty years of precedent establishing that agreements
with language requiring “future recognition” of a union’s majority status, even
if that agreement was initially made under Section 8(f), bar that contractor from
repudiating its relationship with a union that later obtained majority employee
support.225 Surely a non-construction union could make such an agreement with
an employer and demand it be enforced once it can show the employer that it
has such majority support.
The same commenter who requested that the Board extend “contemporaneous
showing” to all industries also requested that the Board “specify that 9(a)
recognition can only occur if an employer employs a substantial and
representative complement of employees[,]”226 to which the Board responded
that “the final rule does not disturb established precedent on this point.”227 If
the Board was honest about that, it would mean, for example, that it would, in
the future, permit voluntarily recognized election of multiemployer units228 or
other units that are not based on a “substantial and representative complement
of employees.”229 It is questionable whether that standard is even workable for
many construction industry employers because, as discussed in prior sections,
construction work is intermittent and many construction employees (and their
employers) do not work every day.230 Construction unions nonetheless must be
permitted to seek and obtain voluntary recognition from such construction
employers because there is nothing in the Labor Management Relations Act that
authorizes withholding employees’ representational rights on the ground that

223. Id. at 18392.
224. See, e.g., Am. Automatic Sprinkler Sys. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 209, 218 (4th Cir. 1998)
(“[W]e . . . discern nothing in either the text or legislative history of the 1959 amendments or, for
that matter, the statutory framework of the Act, to suggest that employees in the construction
industry should in any way be disfavored in their ability to secure union representation . . . .”); see
also NLRB v. Triple A Fire Prot., Inc., 136 F.3d 727, 737 (11th Cir. 1998).
225. See, e.g., VFL Tech. Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. 458, 459–60 (1999).
226. Construction Union Proof Rule, supra note 8 at 18392–93, 18392 n.237 (citing the
Comment of the Center on National Labor Law Policy).
227. Id. at 18392–93.
228. See Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 2016 NLRB LEXIS 592, at *1–3,
(Aug. 16, 2016); J.D. Consulting, LLC, 345 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1300 (2005); Hayman Elec., Inc., 314
N.L.R.B. 879, 879 n.2 (1994).
229. See, e.g., Dist. Council of Painters No. 8 of the Brotherhood of Painters, 326 N.L.R.B.
1074, 1078–79 (1998); G.T. Einstein Elec., Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 816, 819 (1996); S. Interiors, Inc.,
319 N.L.R.B. 379, 380 (1995), enforced 107 F.3d 12 (6th Cir. 1997).
230. See supra Section I.B.
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their employer never has a “substantial and representative complement of
employees.”
For the same reasons regarding the nature of the construction industry, and
because the Board has never defined the meaning of “contemporaneous
showing,” that term will have to be given a different meaning than that in Black’s
Law Dictionary, which is “occurring . . . at the same time.”231 What “same time”
would be used to match the employees who signed cards indicating they wanted
the union to represent them with those working for the employer reviewing those
cards—would the employees have to be working for that employer on that day?
That result would be inconsistent with the nature of construction work because,
again, construction employees do not work every day.
So, will
contemporaneous be defined as the employees working during a week, a payroll
period, or a month? Or will there be some other measure to determine if there
is a majority? It remains to be seen what guidance, if any, the Board will provide
on the meaning of “contemporaneous showing” of majority support.
In any of the above-discussed situations, and more, the Board’s broad
permission for contractor choice would enable contractor gamesmanship, in
which the contractor would break its relationship with the union at an opportune
time and then contest, and thus make an issue in the case, whether the union had
majority support when it said it did, whether the union’s evidence of majority
support actually proves such support, and/or whether the contractor actually saw
that evidence of support as the agreement might arguably require. Furthermore,
in all such cases—especially those in which the contractor prevails—the
contractor would be doing this when, in the past, this contractor, according to its
own contentions, likely committed the illegal act of recognizing as a majority
representative a union not supported by a majority of employees. This result
would thus reward an employer who committed one wrong by green-lighting the
employer’s commission of a second wrong.
If the Board’s Construction Union Proof Rule overruling Staunton Fuel is
challenged, either directly or in any case where a union invokes an agreement to
challenge an employee petition or—more likely—an employer’s repudiation of
its relationship with the union, the court should recognize, as past Boards and
federal courts of appeal have, that the Board’s decision in Staunton Fuel
“properly balances Section 9(a)’s emphasis on employee choice with Section
8(f)’s recognition of the practical realities of the construction industry.”232 It
therefore also balances the two “fundamental statutory objectives” the Board
identified in Deklewa: “employee free choice and labor relations stability.”233
As Professor Alexia Kulwiec of the University of Wisconsin stated, commenting
on the rule when it was proposed, the Staunton Fuel standard should be kept—
not only because it binds parties to their contractual obligations, but also because
231. Contemporaneous, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
232. Staunton Fuel & Material, Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 717, 719 (2001).
233. John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1380 (1987) (emphasis added).
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it is consistent with such contractual labor law realities as that at the time the
contractor recognizes the union a majority of its employees do support the union
as their representative and that if this were not true any employee (or really
anyone else besides the contractor) could challenge as an unfair labor practice
the contractor’s recognizing the union as a majority representative.234 In sum,
the Board’s Staunton Fuel precedent is a reasonable compromise of multiple
current labor law rules, and multiple objectives of American labor law, that the
current Board is obligated to serve.
Nonetheless, the Staunton Fuel standard will no longer be applied by the
Board in representation cases at any level of the agency. The Board now should
avoid worsening the situation by also abandoning Staunton Fuel for unfair labor
practice cases based on withdrawals of recognition by contractors. For all the
reasons discussed earlier in this Article, contractors are not the appropriate
parties to protect “employee choice,” which the Board said was its purpose in
issuing its final Construction Union Proof Rule.235 If the Board were to require,
when a contractor terminates its relationship with the union, that the union prove
such absurd things as evidence of majority support that is “contemporaneous”
with when the employer agreed it existed, or that the employer actually reviewed
the evidence of majority support, the Board would not only be departing from
both Board and federal court precedent, it would be demonstrating that it was
“contractor choice,” and not “employee choice,” that it really cared about all
along.
III. CONSTRUCTION LABOR LAW: THE FUTURE OF ALL LABOR LAW?
As discussed in the Introduction, what the Board does with its recent
overruling of the Staunton Fuel standard and in the decisions it has signaled it
234. See Alexia Kulwiec, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule: Representation—Case
Procedures: Election Bars; Proof of Majority Support in Construction Industry CollectiveBargaining Relationships (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NLRB-20190001-0127; see also Patty Murray, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule: Representation—Case
Procedures: Election Bars; Proof of Majority Support in Construction Industry CollectiveBargaining Relationships (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NLRB-20190001-0151; North America’s Building Trades Unions, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule:
Representation—Case Procedures: Election Bars; Proof of Majority Support in Construction
Industry
Collective-Bargaining
Relationships
(Jan.
9,
2020),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NLRB-2019-0001-0107; James T. Springfield,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule: Representation—Case Procedures: Election Bars; Proof of
Majority Support in Construction Industry Collective-Bargaining Relationships (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NLRB-2019-0001-0007; Road Sprinkler Fitters Local
Union No. 669, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule: Representation—Case Procedures: Election
Bars; Proof of Majority Support in Construction Industry Collective-Bargaining Relationships (Jan.
23, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NLRB-2019-0001-0156. The Board’s
response to these comments was that, during the pendency of the unfair labor practice case, the
agreement would still block any petitions for representation elections. Construction Union Proof
Rule, supra note 8, at 18391.
235. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
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intends to make next—and what the federal courts do in reviewing these
actions—could affect many legal rules outside the construction industry. As was
also stated in the Introduction, that is because in the twenty-first century United
States, in many parts of the American economy—and therefore in millions of
worker-employer relationships and millions of workplaces—the relationship
between workers and their employers, and how the working environment
operates, is becoming more similar to how the construction industry operated
for most of the twentieth century. This section of the Article will discuss ways
in which this is true, or might soon be true in the future.
One of the first ways in which this became true was the growth in “contingent”
and “alternative arrangement” employment in which temporary employees,
seasonal employees, independent contractors, and other workers found
themselves—as construction workers long have—not working in any one
location for very long, and moving from employer to employer, or project to
project. In May 2017, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics found that there were
there were 16.5 million workers, or nearly 14% of the total U.S. workforce,
employed in contingent employment or alternative work arrangements.236 By
the end of 2018, around 16.8 million workers were employed in temporary and
contract staffing employment.237 So-called “temporary help services” alone
(also known as “gig employment”) employ more than 2.5 million workers, with
projections that the number “will grow to more than 3.2 million jobs by 2025.”238
Labor and employment scholars have long recognized that temporary and
contract staffing firms, and other firms referring workers to employers or other
“end-users,” operate much like union hiring halls in the construction industry.
Professors Harris Freeman and George Gonus referred to such firms as “labor
market intermediaries” or “LMIs,” and discussed how they were the functional
equivalents of union hiring halls but were far less regulated by law.239 In the
book Studies of Labor Market Intermediation, professor and labor economist
David H. Autor also compared staffing and other worker referral firms to union

236. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT
ARRANGEMENTS (2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm.
237. E. Mazareanu, Annual Temporary and Contract Staffing Employment in the U.S. 2000–
2018, STATISTA (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/220682/us-total-annualtemporary-employment/.
238. See Temporary Employment in the U.S. to Grow Faster Than All Jobs Through 2025,
According to New Job Forecast from TrueBlue and Emsi, BUSINESS WIRE (Nov. 1, 2019, 5:00
AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191101005170/en/Temporary-EmploymentU.S.-Grow-Faster-Jobs-2025.
239. Harris Freeman & George Gonos, The Commercial Temp Agency, the Union Hiring Hall,
and the Contingent Workforce, in JUSTICE ON THE JOB: PERSPECTIVES ON THE EROSION OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 275, 275, 280 (Richard N. Block et al. eds.,
2006). See also John Thompson, Comment, Grappling with Gilmer: Pre-Hire Arbitration
Agreements in the Day Labor Industry, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 241, 250–54 (2014).
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hiring halls.240 The Board has already changed its rules on labor market
intermediaries three times this century,241 and the current Board members
announced in October 2019 they are “open” to changing it again.242 It cannot
be predicted whether and how the current Board might itself compare
intermediaries to union hiring halls, and base a change in legal rules on staffing
firms and similar intermediaries on its Construction Union Proof Rule regarding
Staunton Fuel and subsequent related precedents.
The construction industry, as this Article discussed earlier, has long had many
layers between the owner and other “end user” and the employees actually
performing the construction work: the end user retaining a construction manager
and/or general contractor to oversee the project, that overseer hiring
subcontractors, and the subcontractors in turn hiring construction workers (or
obtaining them from a union hiring hall or referral firm).243 This kind of
separation of employees from the entity that is really utilizing their work was
called “fissuring” by then-Professor David Weil in his landmark 2014 book The
Fissured Workplace,244 and the term has been adopted by others in describing
how millions of employees are separated by layers of contractors from the entity
that benefits from their work.245 Now-Dean David Weil, in a follow-up to his
book in December, 2019, explained how “fissuring” is commonly done in the
twenty-first century U.S. economy:
[O]ver time, outsourcing spread to activities such as janitorial and
facilities maintenance and security. Later, it went deeper, spreading
into employment activities that could be regarded as core to the
company’s core competency. For example, the use of staffing
agencies for distribution centers began as a response to meet
fluctuating staffing needs driven by the cycle of retail demand. Over
time, however, retailers and their third-party managers began to rely
on it increasingly to staff ongoing activities and later home delivery.

240. David H. Autor, Introduction to STUDIES OF LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIATION 13–14
(David. H. Autor ed., 2009).
241. See M. B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1298 (2000) (overruling Greenhoot Inc., 205
N.L.R.B. 250 (1973)), overruled by H.S. Care L.L.C., 343 N.L.R.B. 659 (2004), in turn overruled
by Miller & Anderson, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 2016 NLRB LEXIS 498, at *6 (July 11, 2016).
242. Stericycle of P.R., Inc., No. 12-RC-238280, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 588, at *2 n.1 (Oct. 31,
2019).
243. See supra Section I.B.
244. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 7 (2014).
245. See e.g., Sharon Block & Benjamin Sachs, Clean Slate for Worker Power: Building a Just
Economy and Democracy, CLEAN SLATE FOR WORKER POWER 2–3, 38–39, 103–04,
https://assets.websitefiles.com/5ddc262b91f2a95f326520bd/5e28fba29270594b053fe537_CleanSlate_Report_FORW
EB.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2020); 1 GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW AND REGULATION § 10.12,
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2020); Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and
Labor Market Power, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 46 (2019).
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Similarly, hotel properties turned to staffing agencies for room
cleaning, restaurants for kitchen crews, and even law firms for basic
legal tasks.
Once an activity like janitorial services, loading dock labor, or
housekeeping is shed, the secondary businesses doing that work are
affected, often shifting those activities to still other businesses. A
common practice in janitorial work, for instance, is for companies in
the hotel or grocery industries to outsource that work to cleaning
companies. Those companies, in turn, often hire smaller businesses to
provide workers for specific facilities or shifts.246
Such arrangements would not be unfamiliar to anyone studying, or
representing employees in, the construction industry. Professor Sharon Block
and Benjamin Sachs, and other contributors to the 2020 Clean Slate report,
recommend “sectoral collective bargaining” by industry, rather than “enterprise
bargaining” by individual employer to address obstacles to “employee choice”
and “employee voice” in the latter.247 Construction unions have already adopted
this approach with multiemployer bargaining with employer associations or by
other means and bargaining some or all terms with “end-users” in Project Labor
Agreements that cover employees of multiple enterprises.248 The current Board
has made clear its interest in enhancing individual contractor choice as to
whether employees will be represented,249 which would increase the problems
for employees identified in the Clean Slate report, and undo the efforts
construction unions have made to remove and mitigate such problems. The
Board’s actions require attention because, whatever rationale(s) the Board gives
for its new rules and that federal courts reviewing those might give for upholding
them, those rationales will also likely be used against any efforts to move
bargaining to a different level than “enterprise”/individual employer bargaining.
The 2020 Clean Slate report also calls for worker organizations to provide
benefits that construction unions have long provided to construction workers,
such as portable health benefits not tied to a specific employer250 and workerand worker-organization controlled hiring halls to provide employees to
employers and industries. The current Board has shown apparent disregard for
how construction union hiring halls actually work and similarly given no
consideration to portable benefits in the industry, thus, in the name of “employee
choice” (but with the actual goal of giving choice to contractors), neglecting the
true interests of unionized construction employees. Whatever justifications this
Board and its defenders give for taking the steps the Board has proposed and
246. David Weil, Understanding the Present and Future of Work in the Fissured Workplace
Context, 5 RSF: THE RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. OF THE SOC. SCI. 147, 148 (2019).
247. Block & Sachs, supra note 245, at 37–40.
248. See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text.
250. See Block & Sachs, supra note 245, at 8, 98, 100–01; compare supra notes 90–97 and
accompanying text.
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inquired about are likely to be raised to defeat hiring halls and portable benefits
in any and all other industries.
In sum, the current struggle over construction labor law in the present is highly
probable to have implications for, and offer lessons for, debates over all labor
law in the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
For reasons discussed throughout this Article, the Board should not further
overrule or revise the Staunton Fuel standard that binds a construction contractor
to its recognition of a union as the majority representative of its employees. That
standard is a valid and sensible compromise that takes into proper account the
realities of the entire construction industry, and the unionized construction
industry. If the Board is not willing to do that for union representation election
cases, the Board should at the least adhere to rules that it and federal courts have
recognized in the past, such as that the union can prove its majority status
through any evidence that is in the case record, or that a contractor cannot renege
on its agreement with a union that its review and confirmation of evidence of a
union’s majority support makes that union a majority representative, or that after
accepting a union’s proof of majority support a contractor cannot later dispute
that the union has a Section 9(a) relationship with that contractor.
Finally, the Board should not revise any of the rules just mentioned to allow
a contractor employer to withdraw recognition from and end its relationship with
a union. In addition, the Board should not revise its Casale Industries rule that
a contractor cannot challenge a union’s majority status, by filing an unfair labor
practice charge or otherwise, after the six-month Section 10(b) period has
expired. Changing this rule or any of the rules discussed in this Conclusion,
would not serve “employee choice” as the Board stated in its proposed rule, but
only the choice of contractors who can usually choose how to hire their
employees and minimize the likelihood that their employees will (at least
immediately) be represented by a union. In fact, contractors will be able to make
and retain their choice on union representation for a long time because,
especially after other changes in union representation law made by the Board
from 2018 through the present, the contractor will be able to delay a
representation election for months or even years. Therefore, as this author
recently suggested about the key legal rules for labor arbitration,251 the legal
rules for construction labor law are something the Board should simply leave
alone.

251. See Michael Hayes, Hey, We Were Here First!: Union Arbitration and the Federal
Arbitration Act, 70 SYRACUSE L. REV. 991 (2020). That article did not discuss NLRB deferral to
arbitration procedures.

